City Council Packet - 06/13/1977 f
TIGARD CITY COUNCIL
REGULAR MEETING
JUNE 13, 1977, 7:30 P.M.
i FOWLER JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL
LECTURE ROOM
i AGENDA:
i
1. CALL TO ORDER
2. ROLL CALL
3. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
4. CALL TO AUDIENCE FOR THOSE DESIRING TO SPEAK ON NON-AGENDA ITEMS
5. CONSENT AGENDA: (All matters under this heading are considered to be routine by
the City Council and will be enacted in one motion in the form
listed below. There will be no separate discussion of these
items. If discussion is desired by any Council member or member
of the audience, that item will be removed from the Consent Agenda
and will be considered separately.)
(a) Approval of Minutes, May 23, and June 6, 1977
(b) Approval of Expenditures and Investments $_ 131.295.78
(c) Receive and File - Written Communications
Transmittal Local Government re: Police Protection + o
I
(d) Accept and authorize execution by Mayor and City Recorder--Summerfield No. 10
Subdivision Compliance Agreement and Cash Bond Escrow Agreement i
6. ACCEPT AND AUTHORIZE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY MAYOR AND CITY RECORDER--Tigard Industrial 1
Park Easement '#1, Robert A. Gray & John R. Bentley
(a) Recommendation of City Administrator
7. ACCEPT STREET DEDICATION - Serge Denoux and Paul Benayoun known as Versailles, a
partnership
(a) Recommendation of City Administrator
8. ORDINANCE No. 77-38 AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO AN APPLICATION
BY URBAN VILLAGES FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE 1970 ZONING MAP OF
THE CITY OF TIGARD CHANGING THE ZONE DISTRICT OF A TRACT OF
LAND DEPICTED ON WASHINGTON COUNTY TAX MAP 1S1 34B, TAX LOT 500
FROM WASHINGTON COUNTY SUBURBAN RESIDENTIAL (RS-1) TO R-7 PD,
RESIDENTIAL PLANNED DEVELOPMENT, AND ADOPTING THE ATTACHED
EXHIBITS A,• B, AND C, AND FIXING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) Second Reading of Ordinance.
9. PUBLIC HEARINGS - COMMENCING AT 8:00 P.M.
NOTICE: All persons desiring to offer testimony on any public hearing item must
placetheir name on the appropriate sign up sheet(s) located at the back of
the room. Persons desiring to testify will then be called forward by the
Chair to speak on the indicated item(s).
A. VACATION OF A PORTION OF A 50 FOOT WIDE DEDICATED PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY IN THE
CITY OF TIGARD, WASHINGTON COUNTY, OREGON, KNOWN AS S.W. COOK LANE.
(a) Public Hearing Opened
(b) Statement of Facts by City Administrator
(c) Public Testimony
Proponents
Opponents
Cross Examination
(d) Recommendation of City Administrator
(e) Public Hearing Closed
(f) Consideration by Council
ORDINANCE No. 77- AN ORDINANCE VACATING DEDICATED UNOPENED PORTION
OF S.W. COOK LANE IN THE CITY OF TIGARD, WASH-
INGTON, OREGON.
10. ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AND OPEN SPACE PLAN - Proposed discussion items include:
Policies for environmental controls on land development
Community design policies
Policies to establish a park and open space system
Park classifications, development policies and standards and potential park sites
Program for acquisition and development
(a) Public Hearing Opened
(b) Public Testimony
(c) -Public Hearing Closed
(d) Consideration by Council
11. ORDINANCE No. 77- AN ORDINANCE ADMENDING AND SUPPLEMENTING CHAPTER 10.28
OF THE TIGARD MUNICIPAL CODE BY ADDING TO SECTION 10.28.130
TO PROHIBIT PARKING ON S.W. SUMMERFIELD DRIVE, BETWEEN DURHAM
ROAD AND ALDERBROOK DRIVE, DECIFARING AN EMERGENCY AND FIXING
AN FICTIVE DATE
Page 2 - City Council Agenda- June 13, 1977
f
(a) Recommendation by City Administrator
i
12. ORDINANCE No. 77- AN ORDINANCE AMENDING AND SUPPLEMENTING CHAPTER 10.28, OF
THE TIGARD MUNICIPAL CODE BY ADDING TO SECTION 10.28. 130
TO PROHIBIT PARKING ON S.W. 68TH AVENUE, DECLARING AN
EMERGENCY AND FIXING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
f
(a) Recommendation of City Administrator
13. ORDINANCE No.' 77- AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE No. 76-49 FOR THE PURPOSE
OF REVISING EXHIBIT "B" THEREOF TO PROVIDE FOR THE COLLECTION
OF AN ADDITIONAL CHARGE IMPOSED BY THE METROPOLITAN SERVICE
DISTRICT. (GARBAGE FRANCHISE GRANTED TO FRANK'S DISPOSAL
i
SERVICE, INC.)
(a) Recommendation of City Administrator
14. ORDINANCE No. 77- AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE No. 76-SO FOR THE PURPOSE OF
REVISING EXHIBIT "B" THEREOF TO PROVIDE FOR THE COLLECTION
OF AN ADDITIONAL CHARGE IMPOSED BY THE METROPOLITAN SERVICE
DISTRICT. (GARBAGE FRANCHISE GRANTED TO MILLER'S SANITARY
SERVICE, INC.)
(a) . Recommendation of City Administrator
15. ORDINANCE No. 77- AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE No. 76-52 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
REVISING EXHIBIT "B" THEREOF TO PROVIDE FOR THE COLLECTION OF
AN ADDITIONAL CHARGE IMPOSED BY THE METROPOLITAN SERVICE
DISTRICT. (GARBAGE FRANCHISE GRANTED,TO SCHMIDT'S SANITARY
SERVICE, INC.)
(a) Recommendation of City Administrator
16. DESCUSSION RE: Park Board letter relating to potential Park Site
(a) Request by Mayor
17. OTHER
18. ADJOURNMENT
Page 2 - City Council Agenda - June 13, 1977
.�' 'q_
TIGARD CITY COUNCIL
REGULAR MEETING MINUTES, JUNE 13, 1977, 7:30 P.M.
1 . ROLL CALL: Present: Mayor Wilbur A. Bishop; Councilmen John E. Cook,
Alan W. Mickelson, Kenneth W. Scheckla, Lynn R. Wakem; Ben
Altman) Assistant Planner; J. D. Bailey, Legal Counsel;
Richar,d .Bolen, Planning Director; Bruce P. Clark, City
Administrator; Doris Hartig, City Recorder.
2, CALL TO AUDIENCE FOR THOSE DESIRING TO SPEAK ON NON-AGENDA ITEMS
(a) No one appeared to speak.
3. APPROVAL OF MINUTES, May 23, and June 6, 1977
(a) Motion to approve; Councilman Mickelson, seconded by Councilman
Cook.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
4. APPROVAL OF EXPENDITURES AND INVESTMENTS: $131 ,295.78
(a) Motion to approve; Councilman Mickelson, seconded by Councilman
Cook.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
5. WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS - Receive and File
Transmittal Local Government Re: Police Protection
(a) Motion to receive and file; Councilman Mickelson, seconded by
Councilman Cook.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
6. SUBDIVISION COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT & CASH BOND ESCROW AGREEMENT -
Summerfield No. 10
(a) Motion by Councilman Mickelson,seconded by Councilman Cook, to
accept and authorize execution by Mayor and City Recorder.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
7. ACCEPT EASEMENT DEDICATION - Tigard Industrial Park Easement #1 , Robert
Gray & John Bently
(a) City Administrator recommended item be removed from agenda.
Administrator further stated it was a private sewer main, serving
private buildings and would not serve the best interest of the
public to accept dedication.
(b) Motion by Councilman Wakem, seconded by Councilman Mickelson,
to decline dedication.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
8. ACCEPT STREET DEDICATION - Serge Denous and Paul Benayoun know as
Versailles, a partnership
(a) City Administrator stated dedication was a result of City action
and recommended Council accept dedication.
(b) Motion to accept; Councilmw! Cook, seconded by Councilman
Wakem.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
9. ORDINANCE No. 77-38AN ORDINANCE .,.DQPTING FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO
AN APPLICATION BY URBAN VILLAGES FOR AN AMEND-
MENT TO THE 1970 ZONING MAP OF THE CITY OF
TIGARD CHANGING THE ZONE DISTRICT OF A TRACT
OF LAND DEPICTED ON WASHINGTON COUNTY TAX MAP
1S1 34B, TAX LOT 500 FROM WABHINGTON COUNTY
SUBURBAN RESIDENTIAL (RS-1 ) TO R-7 PD, RESI-
DENTIAL PLANNED DEVELOPMENT, AND ADOPTING THE
ATTACHED EXHIBITS A, B, AND C, AND FIXING AN
EFFECTIVE DATE.
SECOND READING
(a) Motion by Councilman Scheckla, seconded by Mayor Bishop, to
table Ordinance 77-38 until NPO #7 has developed land use
plan for area.
Councilman Scheckla and Mayor Bishop stated NPO #7 should have
opportunity to formulate their plan and then study proposed
project prior to approval of zone change.
Mayor Bishop further stated in his opinion approval of zone
change would allow spot zoning and inappropriate development
for area.
Motion failed by 3 to 2 vote. Roll call as follows: Council-
men Mickelson, Cook and Wakem voting nay and Councilman Scheckla
and Mayor Bishop voting aye.
(b) Motion to adopt Ordinance No. 77-38; Councilman Mickelson,
seconded by Councilman Cook.
Councilman Wakem requested Planning Director to advise Council
of proposed changes in the development of property.
Director stated due to the length of time it had taken for
developer to go through', the review process required by the
City, the developer had lost his State financing. Director
further stated developer was nqw proposing minor:.- changes to
the proposed PD which would be reviewed by staff and the Plan-
ning Commission if the zone change is approved. Director ad-
vised Council the same number of units were being proposed,
however units would be two bedroom, one story.
Mayor Bishop stated proposed minor changes did not alter his
position.
General discussion by Council and staff followed.
Motion passed by 3 to 2 vote. Roll call as follows: Council-
men Cook, Mickelson and Wakem vdting aye and Councilman Scheckla
and Mayor Bishop voting nay.
10. PUBLIC HEARING - 8:00 P.M.
A. VACATION OF A PORTION OF A 50 FOOT WIDE DEDICATED PUBLIC RIGHT,
OF WAY IN THE CITY OF TIGARD, WASHINGTON COUNTY, OREGON, KNOWN
AS S.W. COOK LANE
(a) Public Hearing Opened.
Mayor Bishop stated he was a nearby property owner and
i7C iuid iu S• B14�7A& had signed the peti ti cin; therefore he
would not participate in consideration of item.
PAGE 2 - REGULAR MEETING MINUTES, JUNE 13, 1977
(b) Administrator rcviewed ::. .5, requirements for vacating
streets. Administrator stated petition was complete with
the exception of signature from Wall Brothers - one of the
four abutting properties required to sign.
Administrator recommended Council take action by; (1 )
continue hearing at later date, after receiving testimony;
or (2) receive testimony and close hearing, then deter-
mine action can not be taken until necessary signature is
obtained.
Council concurred to hear testimony.
(c) Public Testimony:
Proponents: Dick Kluempke, 13450 S.W. Watkins
Everett Spencer, 13370 S.W. Watkins
J.B. Bishop, 4263 N.E. Hazelfern Place, Portland
Opponents: None
General discussion by Council and staff regarding need
for future public access.
(d) Administrator reiterated previous recommended action.
(e) Public Hearing Closed.
(f) Motion by Councilman Scheckla, seconded by Councilman
Wakem, to continue item on June 27th - to be the first
item considered. eol- `���,!,7 ��//�
Approved by # to O vote - Mayor Bis�id abs fining.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AND OPEN SPACE PLAN
(a) Public Hearing Opened.
(b) Planning Director lan and reviewed processeofgdevelop development the plaeneral overview of hproposed
had
through to date.
Assistant Planner Altman presented proposed plan and ex-
plained the intent of the plan.
(c) Public Testimony:
Proponents: Mary Payne, 16935 S.W. 113th, Park Board
member.
Dick Kluempke, 13450 S.W. Watkins - Chairman
of NPO #3•
Roger Zumwalt, 10665 S.W. Pathfinder Way,
Park Board member.
Bill Bieker, 7730 S.W. Cherry - Representing
Tigard School District. Bieker requested
staff read policies which effect the use of
Durham Elementary Bldg.
Altman read Policies 10 and 17.
Mr. Bieker stated there .were ,no. futureplans
at this time to change the function of Durham
Elementary School.
PAGE 3 - REGULAR MEETING MINUTES, JUNE 13, 1977
Opponents: Sally Thomas, 165:75, S.W i'$5.th
Joanna Brookman, 11345 S.W. 95th
Ramona Stell, 16440 S.W. 113th
Charles Webb, 16770 S.W. 113th
Statement of clarification - City Attorney
stated there was no legal difference in the
proposed plan's provision for acquiring land
than presently available to the City. Attorney
Bailey explained process of condemnation.
General discussion by City Attorney and Council
" followed.
Opponents: Arthur Low, 16265 S.W. 113th
(Continued) Ramure & Paul Arlanskas, 16420 S.W. 108th. Mr.
Arlanskas read letter of opposition from his
father.
Waneta M. Chamberlin, 16720 S.W. 108th
Keith Phildius 16565 S.W. 113th
Leon Steel, 16.40 S.W. 113th
Edward Thoennes, 16450 S.W. 113th
Neal Grimstad, 9930 S.W. Durham Rd
Dorothy Pick, 10060 S.W. Durham Rd
Margaret Benz, 16550 S.W. 113th
Staff noted City was in receipt of petitions
opposing proposed park sites from residents
on 113th containing 30 signatures and a 24
signature petition from residents on 108th.
Mayor noted majority of residents speaking in
opposition of plan were from 108th and 113th,
South of Durham Rd. , outside the City limits.
(d) Public Hearing Closed.
(e) Consideration by Council:
(1 ) Councilman Scheckla questioned how City could
place a "hold" on property when located outside
the City.
City Attorney stated the plan does not place a
"hold" on specific property, it merely designates
future park sites. Attorney further stated the
"hold" is placed when development of property is
proposed. City could not deal with properties
outside the City limits.
Attorney commented the County would probably cooper-
ate with the City's plan.
(2) General discussion by Council and staff regarding
formulation of plan, level of Park Board's participa-
tion, the greenway system, intent of plan, boundary
of designated plan area, agricultural areas, 100 year
flood plain area, maintenance cost of proposed park
system and method of implementation of plan.
(3) Motion by Councilman Wakem, seconded by Councilman
Cook. to continue discussion and consideration -,r
PAGE 4 - REGULAR MEETING MINUTES, JUNE 13, 1977
Council at June 20th study session.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
RECESSED 10:20 P.M.
RECONVENED 10:35 P.M.
11 . ORDINANCE No. 77-39 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING AND SUPPLEMENTING CHAPTER
10.28 OF THE TIGARD MUNICIPAL CODE BY ADDING
TO SECTION 10.28.130 TO PROHIBIT PARKING ON
S.W. SUMMERFIELD DRIVE, BETWEEN DURHAM ROAD AND
ALDERBROOK DRIVE, DECLARING AN EMERGANCY AND
FIXING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) City Administrator recommended approval.
(b) Motion to approve; Councilman Cook, seconded by Councilman
Mickelson.
Discussion by Council and staff regarding parking problems
in area.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
12. ORDINANCE No. 77-40 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING AND SUPPLEMENTING CHAPTER
10.28, OF THE TIGARD MUNICIPAL CODE BY ADDING
TO SECTION 10.28.130 TO PROHIBIT PARKING ON
S.W. 68th AVENUE, DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND
FIXING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) City Administrator recommended approval.
(b) Motion to adopt; Councilman Cook, seconded by Councilman
Wakem.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
13. ORDINANCE No, 77-41 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE No. 76-49
FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVISING EXHIBIT " '
THEREOF TO PROVIDE FOR THE COLLECTION OF AN
ADDITIONAL CHARGE IMPOSED BY THE METROPOLITAN
SERVICE DISTRICT. (GARBAGE FRANCHISE GRANTED
TO FRANK'S DISPOSAL SERVICE, INC.)
(a) Motion to adopt; Councilman Cook, seconded by Councilman
Scheckla.
Motion by Councilman Cook, seconded by Councilman Mickelson,
to amend page 3, fourth line to read, " a one yard container
shall be . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ."
Motion to amend approved by unanimous vote of Council.
Discussion by Council, staff, franchise haulers and represent-
ative from Specialized Computer Services regarding amount of
additional fee to be charged.
Ordiance No. 77-41 approved, as amended, by unanimous vote of
Council.
14. ORDINANCE No. 77-42AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE No. 76-50
FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVISING EXHIBIT "B" THEREOF
TO PROVIDE FOR THE COLLECTION OF AN :ADDITIONAL
CHARGE IMPOSED BY THE METROPOLITAN SERVICE
r
DISTRICT. (GARBAGE FRANCHISE GRANTED TO MILLER'S
PAGE 5 - REGULAR MEETING MINUTES, JUNE 13, 1977
SANIT.PAY SER:'T_CE, INC. )
(a) Motion by Councilman Cook, seconded by Councilman Mickelson, to
adopt Ordinance No. 77-42 as amended.
Ordinance No. 77-+2 approved, as amended, by unanimous vote
of Council.
15. ORDINANCE No. 77-43 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE No. 76-52 FOR
THE PURPOSE OF REVISING EXHIBIT "B" THEREOF TO
PROVIDE FOR THE COLLECTION OF AN ADDITIONAL
CHARGE IMPOSED BY THE METROPOLITAN SERVICE
DISTRICT. (GARBAGE FRANCHISE GRANTED TO SCHMIDT'S
SANITARY SERVICE, INC. )
(a) Motion by Councilman Cook, seconded by Councilman Scheckla, to
adopt Ordinance No. 77-43 as amended.
Ordinance No. 77-43 approved, as amended, by unanimous vote of
Council.
16. DISCUSSION RE: Park Board letter relating to potential Park Sites
(a) Mayor referred to his memo regarding letter mailed out by staff
dated May 17, 1977 regarding potential park sites.
Mayor requested Council consensus to; (1 ) issue directive to
City Administrator directing him to advise all department heads
to screen all communication, written or oral that in any way
would or could be interpreted asaccepted
City
havepolicy;
anyc;andt(2)
compose a directive to all y staff
with the public, clarifying their responsibility not to infer
or make City policy when in fact it is not policy.
General discussion by Council and staff followed.
Consensus of Council was not to issue directive to City Admin-
istrator as recommended by the Mayor.
17. OTHER:
(a) Boundary Changes
City Administrator recommended Council consider adopting three
ordinances dealing with boundary changes.
Council concurred.
(1 ) ORDINANCE No. 77-44 AN ORDINANCE RATIFYING, CONFIRMING
RECORDING CHANGE IN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
CITY OF TIGARD BY THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION,
ORDER NO. 10499 INVOLVING LANDS OF MCCOY/
FRISON/CAMP (S.W. 98th AVE & DURHAM ROAD)
SEC. 11 , T2S, R1W, W.M. , WASHINGTON COUNTY,
OREGON RECORDING EFFECTIVE DATE AND DECLARE
ING AN EMERGENCY,
Motion to adopt; Councilman Mickelson, seconded by
Councilman Wakem.
Approved by 4 to 1 vote; Roll call vote as follows: Mayor
Bishop and Councilmen Cook, Mickelson and Wakem voting
ii.man Scheckia abstair�ir�g.
Aye and Counc
PAGE 6 - REGULAR MEETING MINUTES, JUNE 139 1977
Ordinance No. 77-44 will require a second reading.
(2) ORDINANCE No. 77-45 AN ORDINANCE RATIFYING, CONFIRMING
MM—ffECORDING CHANGE IN THE BOUNDARIES OF
THE CITY OF TIGARD BY THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION,
ORDER NO. 1065, INVOLVING LAND. OF ROGER'S
ANNEXATION (S.W. GREENBURG ROAD) SEC. 359
T1$, R1W, W.M. , WASHINGTON COUNTY, OREGON
RECORDING EFFECTIVE DATE AND DECLARING AN
EMERGENCY.
Motion to adopt; Councilman Mickelson, seconded by Council-
man Wakem.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
(3) ORDINANCE No. 77-46 AN ORDINANCE RATIFYING, CONFIRMING AND
TMrMDING CHANGE IN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY
OF TIGARD BY THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION, ORDER
NO. 1066, INVOLVING LAND OF SPIEGEL ANNEXATION
(S.W. NORTH DAKOTA) SEC. 34, T1S, R1W, W.M. ,
WASHINGTON COUNTY, OREGON RECORDING EFFECTIVE
DATE AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.
Motion to adopt; Councilman Wakem, seconded by Council-
man Mickelson.
Approved by unanimous vote of Council.
(b) Grant Street No Parking Signing
Councilman Scheckla questioned if another "No Parking" sign
was needed on Grant Street in the vicinity of Grant and
McKenzie.
Staff to check out.
(c) League of Oregon Cities Workshop
City Administrator notified Council a workshop on "Effective-
ness Through Time Management", was scheduled for June 25th at
Greenwood Inn, Beaverton.
(d) POLLOCK APPEAL
City Administrator advised Council the appeal filed by Mr. &
Mrs. Zumwalt, regarding Pollock PD zone change, may not be
heard by Council due to cost to Zumwalts to provide transcripts.
Administrator estimated cost would be in excess of $300.
General discussion by Council and staff regarding cost of
providing transcripts, the process of setting fees by resolu-
tion and establishing at what point of time appeal deposit be
paid vs when transcripts should be prepared.
Council directed staff to stop processing transcripts pending
deposit by Zumwalts.
(e) Budget Hearing
Reminder - Budget hearing, Thursday, June 16th, Fowler Junior
Nick Library at 8'00 P.M. also C^11=41 Spacial M d.i..g d.n
consider ordinance setting date for election.
PAGE 7 REGULAR MEETING MINUTES, JUNE 13, 1977
Councilman Cook recommended seopnd reading of Ordinance No.
77-44 be conc�uGted at special ee#ng.
(f) SiEMalization of McDonald & Pacifi
City Administrator stated Cihad received notification from
the State Highway Department that fuMds are available to place
signal at McDonald Street and Pagi,fic Highway. Only cost to
City will be energization of',$ignal.
18. ADJOURNED 11 ;55 P.M.
7 -
UTVR
scot er - Ci 6f-Tigard
ATTEST:
Mayor - of Tigard.
i
1
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3
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PAGE 8 REGULAR MEETING M[NtJ=, 41JNE 13, 1977
June 13, 1977
I wish to testify before the Tigard City Council on
the following item: (Please print your name)
Item Description:JEgg� r 14PARTEG - 9-6-
rat-ion of
_A_rationof i pgrtion of a 5 foot wide d dirated nubLir
_xA-P-ht-n1,-wav in the Citv of Tigard. Wash. County, Ore. ,
known as S.W. Cook Lane
Proponent (for) Opponent (against)
Name, Address and Affiliation Name, Address and Affiliation
�) . £ � i V S u1 RiK►�s
3 17,' tc.G.6
a
i
June 13, 1977
I wish to tebcify before the Tigard City Council on the followi..g items:
(Please print your name) Item Description: EgBLIC HEARING item 10. ENVIRONMENTAL
OPF,I LIpACF MAI - Proposed discussion items include: (1) Policies for
environmental controls on land development; (2) Community design policies; (3)
Policies to establish a park and open space system; (4) Park classifications,
development policies and standards and potential park sites; (5) Program for
acquisition and development.
'roponent (for) Opponent (against)
Jame, Address and Affiliation Name, Address and Affiliation
kwm, I b s 7S S 60 WAI
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108th St. Petition to be removed from future Park Plans:
Wer�the residents, and property owners of SW 108th St. DO NOT
WANT A PARK on our Street now, or anytime in the FUTURE.
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This area has responded 100%.
Jur_c 6, 1977
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BILLS PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT
June 13, 1977
GENERAL FUND - U.S. NATIONAL BANK
Check No.
21166 Frank Anderson - Coordinator Community Service Division
Correspondence Course - Mechanical Codes (13) $ 35."J
21167 Gerald Sabins - Witness Fees (11) 7.40
21168 Katherine Bertell - Witness Fees (11) 5.48
21169 Mark Beseau - Witness Fees (11) 7.40
21170 David Lisby - Witness Fees (11) 5.00
21172 Arline O'Leary. -Mileage (12) 10.05
21173 National Rifle.. Assoc. - Pin Bars (16) 30.00
21174 Ben Altman - Mileage & Subsistence (14.1) 20.71
21175 Donald Rea - Mileage & Subsistence (16) 61.20
21176 Tigard Community Federal Credit Union - Payroll Withholding (609A) 521.20
21177 Wash. Co. Federal Credit Union - Payroll Withholding (609B) 564.00
21178 Traveler's Ins. Co. - Employee Retirement
(11) 21.57 (13) 35.31 (608B) 132.08 188.96
21179 ICMA - Administrative Retirement (12) 110.00
21180 Banker's Life Co. - Police Retirement (16) 1,428.26
21181 Oregon Admin. Co. - Payroll Withholding (619) 57.83
21182 U.S. National Bank - Federal Tax Withholding (613) 3,257.60
21183 Oregon Dental Service - Payroll Withholding
(10) 23.54 (12) 23.54 (14) 38.42 (15.1) 32.24 (16.3) 23.54
(11) 14.88 (13) 70.62 (14.1) 31.02 (16) 347.04 (20.3) 8.70 613.54
21184 Public Employees Retirement Fund - Social Security
(11) 42.06 (15.1) 99.00 (16) 1,376.44 (612) 2,419.63
(12) 105.53 (14) 255.79 (16.3) 72.83 (13) 224.41
(14.1) 173.84 (20.3) 69.73 4,839.26
21223 State of Oregon - Payroll Withholding (614) 2,214.00
21224 Tigard Employee Assoc. - Payroll Withholding (604) 14.00
21225 Tigard Police Officers Assoc. - Payroll Withholding (611) 153.00
21226 Western Life Ins. Co. - Police Insurance
(16) 52.00 (16.3) 2.60 (618) 7.15 61.75
21227 Wilbur Bishop - Mileage & Subsistence (10) 28.25
21228 Bobbi Greene - Mileage (11) 4.80
21229 Larry Svart - Subsistence (14.1) 2.40
21230 Pat Robertson - Mileage (12) 3.90
21231 Manpower - Clerk Typist II (12) 332.80
21234 Doris Hartig - Petty Cash Custodian - Office Supplies & Subsistence
(10) 19.95 (12) 18.18 (14.2) 3.14 (15.1) 6.36 (18) 5.18
(11) 4.88 (14) 1.40 (15) 15.35 (16) 23.08 97.44
21233 Doris Hartig - Petty Cash Custodian - Police Supplies (16) 55.00
21235 Mr. C's Camera Co. - Camera &Processing (16) 410.57
21236 Columbia Maintenance - Janitor Supplies
(15) 28.00 (16) 52.00 (18) 251.00 331.00
21237 Dept. of Commerce - Bldg. Code Surcharge (623) 221.94
21238 Don Thomas Petroleum - Gasoline
(12) 27.18 (13) 44.19 (16) 643.96 (19) 23.77 739.10
21239 Doug's Auto Parts - Miscellaneous Auto Parts (16) 125.56
Bills Payable
June 13, 1977
Page 2
GENERAL FUND - US NATIONAL BANK - Cont.
Check No.
21240 Durham - Dawney - Printing
21241 Harris Uniforms - Police Uniforms (1 417.48
(166)) 80.38
21242 The Identi Kit Co. - Systems Rental (16) 27.00
21243 Leonard Adams Inc. - Ins. - Fire & Floater Equip. (18) 2,350.00
21244 Maryatt Industries - Laundry (20) 55.00
21245 Nine-T-Nine Sales - Towing & Misc. Supplies (16) 14.88
21246 N.W. Law EnforcemgPI: Equipment - Evidence Bags (16) 38.42
21247 N.W. Natural Gas. Co. - Utilities
(15) 21.64 (16) 4.62 (18) 32.62 (20) 92..76 151.64
21248 State Court Admin. - Subscription (16) 60.00
21249 Oregon Culvert - Culverts & Assessories (20) 1,434.40
21250 Oregonian - Advertising -Planner (14) 58.52
21251 Pargas - Propane (13) 72.64
21252 Peter's -Office Supply - file Jackets (13) 65.00
21253 Portland Concrete Pipe - Catch Basin, Frame Grates (20) 964.44
21254 Rentex Corp. - Laundry
(15) 8.65 (16) 15.40 (18) 13.50 37.55
21255 Sanderson's Safety - Sound Measuring Kit & Supplies
(20) 74.57 (20.3) 500.00 574.57
21256 Schwenn, Bradley, Batchelor - April & May Legal Service
(11) 12.00 (18) 2,774.00 2,786.00
21257 S.W. Office Supplies - Misc. Office Supplies (16) 9.10
21258 Standard Oil Co. - Gasoline (16) 64.44
21259 Territorial Supplies - Fingerprint Supplies (16) 50.91
21260 Tigard Arco - Car Wash (16) 5.00
21261 Youth Service Tigard Community Center - Special Services (22) 19.95
21262 Tigard Loaves & Fishes - Special Services (22) 8.00
21263 Tigard Times - Notice of Public Hearing
(10) 18.90 (14) 34.45 53.35
21264 U.S. News & World Report - Subscription (15.1) 14.95
21265 Valley Communications - Radio Repair & Maintenance (16) 149.00
21266 Ward Harris Inc. - Receiver & Card Printing (12) 9.25
21267 Xerox - Printing
(622) 38.13 (16) 258.60. 296.73
21268 Multnomah County - Office Supplies
(10) 23.62 (13) 6.08 (14.2) 1.64
(11) .28 (14) 61.22 (15) 6.69 (18) (13.42)
(12) 8.23 (14.1) 7.72 (16) 239.08 (19) 6.95 348.09
21269 Mr. C's Camera Co. - Film Processing - Finger Print Paper
(16) 69.10 (19) 20.85 89.95-
21270 Day Timer - Refill (12) 13.19
21271 Paul C. Johnson - Mileage (16) 15.30
21272 Oregonian- Advertise Construction Inspector (20) 41.80
21273 Shannon Co. - Engineer Supplies (19) 11.60
21274 Portland General Electric - Utilities (18) 619.58
21275 Tigard Arco - Car Wash (16) 4.00
21276 Wor?=an's C.=pansation - Citation (IS) 55.00
21277 Manpower - Clerk Typist II (12) 249.60
BD U.S. National Bank -Printed Checks (18) 38.46
Bills Payable
June 13, 1977
Page 3
GENERAL FUND - US NATIONAL BANK - Cont.
Check No.
BD U.S. National Bank - Bonds (610) 150.00
4580 World of Dinettes (15) 38.00
28,101.67
Payroll 27,215.01
55,316.68
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT CHARGE FUND - US NATIONAL BANK
Check No.
21171 Nelson H. Corbett - Refund (756) 200.00
SEWER FUND - US NATIONAL BANK
Check No.
21176 Tigard Community Federal Credit Union - Payroll Withholding (609A) 415.00
21177 Wash. County Federal Credit Union - Payroll Withholding (609B) 196.00
21178 Traveler's Ins. Co. - Employee Pension
(104) 44.83 (608B) 99.37 144.20
21181 Oregon Admin. Co. - Payroll Withholding (619) 10.30
21182 U.S. National Bank - Federal Payroll Withholding (613) 675.00
21183 Oregon Dental Service - Dental Ins. (108) 73.77
21184 Public Employee Retirement Fund - Social Security
(101) 275.06 (612) 275.06 550.12
21223 State of Oregon- State Withholding (614) 243.00
21239 Doug's Auto Parts - Misc. Auto Parts (240) 16.93
21268 Multnomah Co. - Misc. Office Supplies (201) .16
3363 N.W. Sewer Equip. - Used EZ Rod Reel and Rods (220) 275.00
3364 Unified Sewerage Agency (753-755) 48,812.84
3365 Watt Welding Supply - Check Valves (220) 10.80
3366 Dough Auto Parts - Misc Auto Parts (240) 1.64
51,424.76
Payroll 2,780.18
54,204.94
BANCROFT ASSESSMENT FUND - US NATIONAL BANK
Check No.
4564 First National Bank - Coupons (9) 212.50
STATE TAX STREET - US NATIONAL BANK
Check No.
21176 Tigard Community Federal Credit Union - Payroll Withholding (609A) 604.10
21177 Wasl . County Federal Credit Union - Payroll Withholding (609B) 174.00
a
Bills Payable
June 13, 1977
Page 4
STATE TAX STREET - US NATIONAL BANK - Cont.
Check No.
21178 Traveler's Ins. Co. - Employee Retirement (104) 44.83
21182 U.S. National Bank - Federal Withholding. (613) 675.00
21183 Oregon Dental Service - Dental Insurance (108) 73.77
21184 Public Employees Retirement Board - Social Security
(101) 275.06 (612) 275.06 550.12
21223 State of Oregon- State Withholding (614) 243.00
21224 Tigard Employee Assoc. - Payroll Withholding (604) 12.00
21238 Don Thomas Petroleum - Gasoline (210) 244.19
21239 Doug's Auto Parts - Misc. Auto Supplies
(210) 69.76 (220) 15.97 (240) 22.75 (312) 141.05 249.53
21251 Pargas - Propane (210) 313.69
21257 Standard Oil - Bitumuls (240) 32.56
21265 Valley Communication - Radio Maint (291) 24.50
21268 Multnomah County - Misc. Supplies (220) 16.83
21274 Portland General Electric - Utility (282) 2,350.08
4565 A-Boy West - Electrical & Plbg Supplies (240) 27.24
4566 Barbur Blvd. Rental - Rental - Disc (214) 30.00
4567 Case Power & Equip - Paint (240) 12.72
4568 Marine Lumber - Keys-ring - extension cord
(220) 3.28 (240) 10.37 13.65
4569 Clark Lumber Co. - 2 rolls survey tape (220) 7.00
4570 Halray Auto Parts - Oil for Lawn Mower (220) 2.19
4571 Oregon Toro - Replace Sprinklers - Jack Park (241) 119.76
4572 Power Rents Inc. - Equipment Rental (214) 24.00
4574 John M. Thomas - Fertilizer (220) 174.00
4575 Tigard Sand & Gravel - Rock (220) 288.68
4576 Tigard Water District - Utility (260) 46.00
4577 Traffic Safety Supply - Posts and Paint (220) 754.70
4579 Willamette Industries - Misc Bldg. Supplies
(220) 91.17 (240) 4.04 95.21
4581 Cascade Construction - Asphaltic Concrete (240) 106.80
4582 Case Power & Equip - Tie Rod - Tie Rod End (240) 34.68
4583 Casey Tractor & Equip - Lock & Lock Plate (240) 1.60
4584 Power Rents - Equipment Rental (214) 121.12
4585 Tigard Sand & Gravel - Rock (240) 89.22
7,554.77
Payroll 2,694.35
10,249.12
FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING - US NATIONAL BANK
Check No.
21176 Tigard Community Federal Credit Union - Payroll Withholding (609A) 301.72
21178 Traveler's Ins. Group - Employee Pension
(104) 31.88 (608B) 21.25 53.13
21179 ICMA Retirement - Administrative Retirement (21) 170.10
21181 Oregon Admin. Assoc. - Payroll Withholding (619) 13.65
Bills Payable
June 13, 1977
Page 5
FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING --US NATIONAL BANK - cont.
Check No.
21182 U.S. National Bank - Federal Withholding
(613) 369.50
21183 Oregon Dental Service - Dental Insurance 69.40
(17) 14.88 (21) 54.52
21184 Public Employees Retirement Board - Social Security 524.12
(17) 102.61 (21) 159.45 (612) 262.06 (614) 272.20
21223 State of Oregon - State Tax Withholding (21) 9.68
21268 Multnomah Co. - Office Supplies (18) 818.84
4573 J. Thayer - 2 fire proof file cabinets (21) 11.72
4578 Western Office Supplies - Calculator Ribbons
4586 Zarosinski Tatone Enginees Co. - Progress-Payment II
Storm Sewers - Pathways
Overlay etc. (18) 5A598.5
6
8,212.56
Payroll 2,899.98
11,112.54
BILLS PAYABLE 95,706.26
MAY PAYROLL 35.589.52
131,295.78
Cl. .•
Answers to
Recent Inquiries
May 1977 No. 59
IS A CITY OR OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION THAT HAS POWER TO PROVIDE GENERAL
POLICE PROTECTION ENTITLED TO SUCH PROTECTION FROM THE COUNTY OR THE SHERIFF
OF THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE CITY OR SUBDIVISION LIES? IF SO, WHAT DETERMINES
THE LEVEL OR AMOUNT OF SERVICE TO BE PROVIDED� AND HOW CAN THE OBLIGATION TO
SERVE BE ENFORCED?
Abstract
In Oregon, the county sheriff in a general law county has a statutory duty
to enforce state law both inside and outside cities or any other political
subdivisions to which law enforcement authority may have been delegated.
In a home rule county the law imposes the same duty upon the governing body
or any official responsible for law enforcement.)
The sheriff or other authority has broad discretion, however, regarding the
level of police services provided in a particular area of the county. Ex-
cept where an equal protection issue is involved, moreover, there appears
to be no practical legal remedy by which to enforce the sheriff's duty in-
side a particular subdivision of the county.
Equal protection would be most likely to support a suit by a political sub-
division if the subdivision could allege discrimination on the basis of the
race or wealth of its inhabitants or some other arbitrary classification.
The courts would give the benefit of the doubt to the sheriff or county if
the reasonableness of a classification were contested.
Particularly in view of the rule that two municipal corporations cannot
carry on the same functions in the same territory at the same time, it
appears that the sheriff or other authority has discretion to provide police
services at a reduced level or none at all in a subdivision which has law
enforcement powers of its own, while retaining both the duty and the author-
ity to enforce state law within the boundaries of such a subdivision.
I
A long tradition in Anglo-American law makes the sheriff "the principal con-
servator of the peace for his county.2 It is the sheriff's duty to "see that
i
1. Orexon C stituti m Article VIS sec. 10 (1958, 1960).
2. Mttrfr (1884). See A1s9 34 Helsbcuv's LL,s of Enxica (Simands 3rd ea. 1966) 680.
the peace and order of the community is (sic) maintained" and "to protect
the lives, property, health, and morals of the people."3 ^�
Oregon's statutory law furthers this tradition:
The sheriff is the chief executive officer and conservator
of the peace of the county. In the execution of his office,
it is his duty to:
(1) Arrest and commit to prison all persons who break the
peace, or attempt to break it, and all persons guilty
of public offenses.
(2) Defend his county against those who, by riot or other-
wise, endanger the public peace or safety . . . .4
All city territory in Oregon lies in one county or another. So does all
territory in other political subdivisions in the state. The duty of the
sheriff as "conservator of the peace of the county" to arrest certain per-
sons and commit them to prison and to protect his county "against those
who . . . endanger the public peace or safety" therefore extends into what-
ever cities and other political subdivisions lie in the county.5
All Oregon cities have power to provide themselves .,sneral police protection.
The few small cities that operate under the 18:J law on municipal government
have power under that law to provide police protection.6 Cities with legis-
lative or home rule charters that confer power by specific lists have power
to provide police protection.? The few small cities that operate under the
1941 law on municipal incorporation and the many cities that operate under
home rule charters adopted since 1930 have general grants of power that in-
clude power to provide police protection.8
The larger the city, the more extensively does it usually provide itself
police protection. As this city protection increases, usually county police
protection in the city decreases. The decrease of policing by the sheriff
in the face of increasing city policing does not, however, abrogate the
sheriff's powers and duties of law enforcement inside cities. The expansion
of city police protection inside cities, the corresponding retraction by the
sheriff of law enforcement inside cities, and the on-going responsibilities
of the sheriff in the evolving situation are in Oregon apparently very much
like the situation in Missouri described as follows in an opinion by the
supreme court of that state a generation ago. Explaining its affirmation
of a decision to oust the sheriff of Jackson County from his office because
3. 2 Arderson, Sheriffs. Coroners, sni Constables 592 (1941).
4. OBS 2 .O10.
5. Slee also iiapson v. Kulnth, 165 F.Supp. _`I:2, 546 (W.D. Mich., 1958) (sheriff s "authority ex-
terds over the entire county ,d includes all municipalities within his comet.,); People
•r. Scott, 66 Cel. Rptr. 257, 265 (1968); In re Sclzm=i, 125 Ch.St. 5`94, 183 N.E. 531, 532
(1932); 80 C2=j6-
a.Juxl 5ecurdum 205 (1953).
6. See ME 221.916, particularly subsections, (10) and (14).
7. Seo ticularl charter sections conferring powers on city councils.
8. See ORS 221.401(l); general grants of power in post-1.030 home rule charters; Bureau of 11hazici-
pal Research and Service, Model Charter for Oreacn Citi s (anv edition), sections 3 and 4 (on
which most grants of power in post-1930 charters have been patterned.
-2-
of his failure to enforce certain laws in the county, the court said:
A further argument of respondent [sheriff] is that he should not
be charged with the failure of law enforcement in Kansas City as
charged because the duty to enforce the law there was upon the
metropolitan police department. ...while the violations charged
were prevalent throughout Jackson County the greater number did
take place in Kansas City. But it cannot be successfully asserted
that a local police force has supplanted the sheriff in his dutias
as a peace officer. His is an important office, and one of the
oldest known to law. Under the common law he was the conservator
of the peace within the county, had the safe keeping of the county
jail and commanded the posse comitatus. One author says that 'for
a thousand years the sheriff has been the principal conservator of
the peace in his county, with full power to command, whenever nec-
essary, the power of the county. ' Murfree on Sheriffs. He has
also been referred to as the chief executive of his county. By
statute [in Missouri] —he is made the conservator of the peace
within his county. ... 'sheriffs are given power, and it is made
their duty, to preserve the peace, arrest and commit to jail all
felons, traitors, and other misdoers.... ' The powers and duties
of conservator of the peace exercised by the sheriff are not strictly
Judicial; but he may be said to act as the chief magistrate of his
county, wielding the executive power for the preservation of the
public peace, and it has been held that the duty of a sheriff in
the enforcement of the law implies initiative on his part, and
that he must be reasonably alert with respect to possible viola-
tions of the law, and is not entitled to wait until they come to
his personal knowledge, but must follow up information received
from any source.
His authority is county wide. He is not restricted by municipal
limits. For better protection and for the enforcement of local
ordinances the cities and towns have their police departments or
their town marshals. Even the state has its highway patrol.
Still the authority of the sheriff with his correlative duty re-
mains. It has become the custom for the sheriff to leave local
Policing to local enforcement officers but this practice cannot
alter his responsibility under the law. ...a policeman is an
officer whose duties have been, for local convenience, carved out
of the old duties of constable, and the constables were always
part of the general force at the disposal of the sheriff. There
is no division of authority into those of the sheriff and the
police. Each is a conservator of the peace possessing such power
as the statutes authorize. See Vickers on Police Officers. In
every county there are a number of peace officers of varying
authority. They and the sheriff must work in harmony. In the
larger communities where dense population has increased the hard-
ship of proper law enforcement police departments have developed
scientific methods of crime detection and prevention. Larger
means and a greater number of men are available to a local police
department than to a county sheriff. Methods of rapid communica-
-3-
tion and transit are provided. Under these circumstances the
sheriff may leave local enforcement in local hands, but only
so long as reasonable efforts in good faith are made to en-
force the law.
The courts have taken cognizance of the development of local
enforcement agencies. It has been held, and correctly so, that
a sheriff may assume that a city police department will do its
duty in enforcing the law and hence will not be guilty of any
serious neglect of duty if he gives little attention to police
matters in such city. But this rule has a proper qualification.
If the sheriff has reason to believe that the police force is
neglecting its duty it is his duty to inform himself. And if
he knows that the police are ignoring or permitting offenses,
his duty to prevent and suppress such offenses is the same as
it would be if there was no municipality and no police force.
The derelictions of other officials cannot excuse his failure
to perform his statutory duties. State ex rel. Thompson v.
Reichman, 135 Tenn. 653, 188 S.W. 225, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 889.
Therefore, under the facts of this case the sheriff cannot ex-
cuse his neglect of duty in Kansas City by placing the responsi-
bility on the Kansas City Police Department. The evidence shows
the police department was permitting, knowingly and without in-
terference, such violations; had done so over a period of time
and respondent had knowledge both of such violations and of the
willing neglect of the police to enforce the law. The excuses
now advanced by respondent that he was engaged in other duties,
that he had not a sufficient staff for proper enforcement, and
that he relied on the advice of his statutory attorney are not
sufficient or valid. A public official holds his office cum
onere with all responsibilities attached. Commonwealth ex rel.
School District v. Tice, 282 Pa. 595, 128 A. 506.9
At that time the Missouri law on sheriffs resembled the present Oregon law on
sheriffs. The Missouri opinion is therefore authority for the conclusion that
an Oregon sheriff has a basic duty to see that police protection is provided
inside the cities in his county. The opinion is, however, also authority for
the conclusion that the level of his policing at a particular time in a par-
ticular city may be inverse to the level of the police protection that the
city is providing itself at that time. To the extent, therefore, that the
governing authorities of a city do not provide the city the police protection
that the sheriff has a duty to provide, that duty becomes operative for him,
and he is obligated to discharge it.
The law that is the basis for that protection is, however, state law. The
sheriff is a county officer.10 Partly because a county is traditionally an
9 State on inf. of 2dcKittrirls v. Williams► 346 Mo. 1003, 144 S.W.2d 98 (1940).
10. Oregon Con�tituti m, Article VI, 5ection 6; OES 206.010; Shaw v. Christofferson (sometimes cited
as Be Guardianshipp of Hampson's Fstate), 190 Or. 2799 289, 223 P.2d 1039 (1950); 2 Ardersont
yp.ct. 592 (1941).
-4-
agency of the state,ll the sheriff is also a state o£ficer.12 Except by
special arrangement with a city,13 he is not a city officer. The law
that he is charged with enforcing is accordingly state law. To the ex-
tent that his county effectuates county police regulations, he commonly
has a duty to enforce county law. Except by special arrangement with a
city, he has no duty to enforce city law.
II '
How may the sheriff's duty to conserve the peace and enforce the law be
itself enforced? What sanctions does the law afford for inducing the
sheriff to provide police protection?
The common law afforded a criminal sanction. It is the undisputed princi-
ple of the common law," said the United States Supreme Court over a hundred
years ago, "that for a breach of a public duty, an officer [in this con-
text, a sheriff] is punishable by indictment."13 At the same time the court
referred to "the sheriff" as being "punishable by indictment as for a mis-
demeanor, in cases of a breach of some public duty."14 In Oregon no sheriff
appears to be so punishable; the law of the state appears to afford no
criminal sanction for enforcing the sheriff's duties as conservator of the
peace.
In contrast to the ability under Missouri law to oust a sheriff as noted
above, Oregon law does not appear to provide for judicial ouster of a
sheriff for failure to discharge his legal duties.
The law of tort liability appears to afford little sanction for inducing a
sheriff to provide police protection. The general rule is that a person who
claims to have suffered injury or damage because of a sheriff's failure to
provide police protection may not in a tort action hold the sheriff liable
for the nonfeasance.15 The reason is that the sheriff's duty to enforce the
law is a duty owed to the public in general and that such a duty is not one
breach of which generates tort liability.16 Only if the claimant can show
a violation under the Federal Civil Rights Actl7 or can establish a special
duty by the sheriff to that claimant--and such duties appear to be rare in-
deed--does failure to discharge the duty generate tort liability.18 Private
lawsuits for damages therefore provide little incentive for a sheriff to dis-
charge his duties of law enforcement.
Mandamus does not appear to be a useful remedy for a sheriff's nonfeasance
in policing. The sheriff is characterized as a ministerial officer.19
11. 0. Etter, "County Home Rule in Orogont' 46 Oregon I-w Review 251, 273 (1967).
12. State v. Van Wormer, 103 Kan. 309, 173 P. 1076, 3079 1918 i State v. McCarty, 104. Sana.. 301,
179 P. 3099 311, 3 A.Z.R. 12883 (1919), 1 Andersong m. cit. 5. Cf. 70 Pmed N397 1950)
(2d ed. 1973) 132, citing Shaw v. Chistoffersen, 190 Or. 279, 289, 223
(sheriff is a county officer representing the executive or administrative power of the state).
13. South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396, 402 (1856).
14. Ibid.
15. 70 American Juri,_-Pru3ence (2a ed. 1973) 170.
16. Annotation, 41 A.L.R. 3d 700, 702 (1972).
17. —S-e--, id., 703.
18. Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 5}8, 456 row 456, 41 A.L.R. 3d 692, 696 (1969).
19. 70 American Jurisprudence (2a ed. 1973) 132.
-5-
"In his ministerial capacity," the United States Supreme Court has said,
"he is bound to execute all processes issuing from the courts of justice."20
To the extent that his duties are ministerial, they are enforceable by writs
of mandamus.21 The sheriff's duty to conserve the peace and enforce the law
in general is, however, much more discretionary. The United States Supreme
Court has indicated that it is quasi-judicial.22 The sheriff has wide lati-
tude in determining where and how to direct the resources of his office in
order to provide maximum police protection. while "a sheriff must enforce
the criminal law,"23 he "is not required to patrol his county as a policeman,
nor to ferret out crime as a detective."24 Mandamus is of little or no use
in controlling a sheriff's activities such as patrol, crime detection, crowd
control, and general crime prevention.
If, therefore, a sheriff does not curry on his policing functions satisfac-
torily, the individual's and the public's remedy appears, at least in Oregon,
to be more political than judicial. In this state informal political pres-
sures and the recall appear to be more effective than tort claims and man-
damus for inducing sheriffs to discharge their normal policing duties.
III
This conclusion about the comparative utility of judicial and political
remedies appears to be true notwithstanding certain features of the constitu-
tional law of equal protection that appear to afford a limited basis for com-
pelling police protection. If the failure to provide that protection denies
any person in the county the equal protection of the laws, judicial redress
of the denial is available. Unless the failure can be shown to be motivated
by considerations of race or welath, however, it appears to be extremely dif-
ficult to demonstrate that the failure denies equal protection.
The Equal Protection Clause says that no state may "deny any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."25 Under that clause a
state includes the political subdivisions of the state.26 A county, accord-
ingly, may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."
If a political subdivision may not deny "the equal protection of the laws,"
is it nonetheless entitled to that protection from the sheriff of the county
in which the political subdivision lies? The answer to that question is not
clear. It has been said that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not embrace
public corporations.1127 It has also been said that school districts, one
type of political subdivision, "are not legally subject to injury under the
20. South v. Marylana, 18 Haw. 396, 402 (1856).
21. See 2 Anaerson,M. cit. 662.
22. South v. Marjland, 18 How. 396, 403 (1856).
23. 80 Co=us Juris Secuauium 211-12 (1953).
24.. In re Sulzmozm, 125 oh.St. 594, 183 N.E. 531, 532 (1932).
25. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, (1868).
26. 5 X.(Q1411ins Municipal Corporations (3a ed. rev. 1969) 445, 16 American Juri.sore$ence (2d ed.
1964) 856.
27. Scott v. Frazier, 258 F. 669, 671 (D.C., N.D., 1919).
-6-
- ll
Equal Protection Clause."28 A few years ago, however, a federal court
emphasized that this doctrine of no guarantee of equal protection to a
political subdivision was limited to state-local relations--that only in
its relation vis-a-vis the state that created it did a political subdivi-
sion lack the right of equal protection.29 In local-local relationships,
the court held--the controversy before the court involved a challenge by
a township of a town zoning ordinance--"a municipal corporation like any
other corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
went and is entitled to its protection."30 If, however, the law that the
sheriff is responsible for enforcing in a particular situation is state
law, it is arguable that in that enforcement he is a state officer and
therefore that vis-a-vis him the political subdivision has no right to equal
protection.
Whether or not a city or other political subdivision is entitled as such to
"the equal protection of the laws," the people of the city or other sub
divi
sion are so entitled.31 Always the word "persons" in the Equal Protection
Clause has been understood to include natural persons. The people of the
city or other subdivision accordingly have judicial recourse to redress
denial of equal protection, provided, of course, they have standing to sue.32
The Equal Protection Clause was added to the federal constitution largely be-
cause of a desire to prevent discrimination based on race.33 Quite logically,
therefore, racial discrimination has figured in the vanguard cases that have
interpreted and applied the clause.
One such case is Yick Wo v. Hopkins.34 That case arose out of systematic
exclusion of Chinese but not Caucasians from the laundry business in San
Francisco a hundred years ago. In Yick Wo the United States Supreme Court
enunciated the landmark doctrine:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance, yet if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar cir-
cumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.35
Although this doctrine emanates from a case arising out of racial discrimina-
tion, the principle inherent in the doctrine is, by its very terms, not
limited to discrimination based on race. Any administration "by public
authority," if on any basis so unequal "as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights," denies them "the equal protection of the laws."
Yick Wo arose out of regulation, restriction, even prohibition. Yet the
quoted doctrine is not limited to these governmental functions. By its very
28. Triplett v. Tiem =j, 302 F.Supp. 1239 (D.C. Neb. 1969).
29. Tom3ship of River Vale v. Tom of Orangetovm, 4.03 F.2d 684, 686 (C.C., gds 1968).
30, Ibid.
31. Triplett v. Tiemam, 302 F.Supp. 1239, 1242 (D.C. Neb., 1969).
32. Ibid.
33. 17i— ri J &once (2d ed. ia,&) M.
34. 11$U.S. 3� 1 bb).
35. 118 U.S., at 373-74.
-7-
terms it is applicable broadly to any administration of any law "by public
authority." Laws that provide for rendering nonregulatory public services
conceivably may be so administered as '"to make unjust and illegal discrimi-
nations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights."
When such laws are so administered, under Yick Wo that administration denies
"the equal protection of the laws."
The possibility of police services being so administered is indicated analo-
gously, again in a context of racial discrimination, by the landmark deci-
sion in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw.36 There a federal court required a .
Mississippi town to honor the Equal Protection Clause by providing the town's
black sector street surfacing, street lights and sewerage comparable to those
services as previously provided by the town in its white sector. The plain-
tiff blacks did not allege denial of equal police services. The principle
of the decision appears, however, to be just as applicable to those services
as to the adjudicated functions. If, therefore, solely or primarily because
of racial considerations, a county provided a political subdivision in the
county police services at a substantially lesser level than in the remain-
der of the county, the Equal Protection Clause apparently would entitle the
people of the political subdivision, if not the political subdivision as a
legal entity, to police services at a parity with the remainder of the
county.
Classification based on race is, in the eyes of the courts, "highly suspect."37
So is classification based on wealth.38 Failure of the county to provide cer-
tain persons police services solely or primarily because the people were rich
or poor would therefore apparently deny them "the equal protection of the
laws."
If the disparity were not based on wealth or race but nevertheless were, in
the words of Yick We, so unequal...as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights," the disparity would deny "the equal protection of the laws." To
prove the unconstitutionality of the disparity, however, would probably be
extremely difficult. The reason, as Yick Wo indicates, is that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause allows reasonable classification. The latitude for the classifi-
cation is, moreover, very broad. The classification is not invalidated if the
courts can conceive of some factual basis for it.
...when a classification is questioned, if any facts can reason-
ably be conceived which will sustain it, their existence must be
assumed.39
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial
of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.40
36. 437 F.2a 5th Cir. 1971), TVSR 303 F.Supp. 1162 (N.D. lass., 1969), affd 461 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1972).
37. Ia., 437 F.2d at 1287.
38. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969), Bawdns v. Tom of Shaw, 437 F.2d
1286, 1287 (1971). See also Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1965).
39. Philadelphia, Baltimore, an 7Washington Pai. lroad Co. v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington,
X `,--.Ch- 215, 57 7
40. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935).
-8-
The latter statement appears to be just as applicable to administrative
discrimination as to legislative discrimination.
The difficulty of proving denial of equal protection in the face of the
quoted doctrine can be illustrated by noting various combinations of in-
equality and equality. Police services unequal on the basis of area may
be equal on the basis of population. Police services unequal on the basis
of population may be unequal on the basis of the amount of property to be
protected. Police services unequal on the basis of the amount of property
to be protected may be equal on the basis of the vulnerability of the prop-
erty to theft or vandalism. Police services unequal on the basis of-one or
more of the factors just listed may arguably be equal on the basis of fac-
tors such as recent incidence of crime, public expenditure for police
services, or number of public personnel devoted to police services. A single
such basis for equality would tend to make the services equal within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and might by itself be sufficient to
do so.
This result is facilitated by two closely related doctrines. One is that
"perfect equality in a law is not required or always possible."41 The other
has been stated thus:
If the evidence or conclusions drawn therefrom leave it fairly
debatable as to Whether there is a reasonable basis for classifi-
cation, the courts may not override the legislative determination.
The proof must show that the classification 4s wholly without any
rational basis and is essentially arbitrary.
Classifications in legislation and administration involves discerning and
weighing factors like those listed in the second immediately preceding para-
graph. Decision making on the basis of such factors is commonly so compli-
cated and so dependent on discretion that the courts accord legislators and
administrators wide latitude in this function. The federal district court
that issued the first of the three reported opinions in Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw based its decision partly on this doctrine:
.. .exercise of administrative judgment in diverse areas of local
government...is a field in which courts should be reluctant to
enter because of their incompetence, generally, to bring about a
better result than officials chosen by the local inhabitants.43
In striking that judicial posture the court relied in part on a statement by
the United States Supreme Court a few years earlier:
Normally, the widest discretion is allowed the legislative judg-
ment in determining whether to attack some or all of the manifes-
tations of the evil aimed at; and normally that judgment is given
41. 16A Corpus duris Secundum 314 (1956).
42 %villin, Muniai al Cor orations (3d ed. 1949) 5o6 (emphasis supplied).
'-j. 30 F.Supp. 1162, 1169 kN.D. Miss., 1969).
-9-
the benefit of every conceivable circumstance which might suf-
fice to characterize the classification as reasonable rather
than arbitrary and invidious.44
The federal circuit court that issued the final reported opinion in Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, although reversing the district court on other grounds,
continued along the same line:
Federal courts are reluctant to enter the field of local gov-
ernment operations. The conduct of municipal affairs is an
extremely awkward vehicle to manage. ...not every...disparity
of service between citizens of a town or city creates a right
of access to the federal courts for redress.46
These three quotations reinforce a long standing rule in the law of munici-
pal corporations:
...exercise of the powers of the municipality with respect to
...the furnishing of public services, rests in the sound discre-
tion of the governing municipal authorities, insofar as the
matter is not controlled by positive law, and the courts will
not undertake to control or interfere with the exercise of such
discretion in the absence of bad faith or abuse.46
It therefore appears that a lesser level of police service in a political
subdivision of a county does not deny the subdivision or its people equal
protection unless the disparity is completely arbitrary or based primarily
or exclusively on race or wealth. To prove the arbitrariness seems to be
very difficult, and even to prove the basis of race or wealth may be dif-
ficult.47
IV
The foregoing analysis of equal protection is consistent with the principle
in the law of municipal corporations that generally two municipal corpora-
tions cannot carry on the same functions in the same territory at the same
time. Upon first consideration that principle may seem to be inconsistent
with the analysis. Actually, however, the principle reinforces the conclu-
sions to which the analysis leads.
Courts have been confronted on many occasions with disputes about local gov-
ernmental power or liability arising out of exercise or attempts to exercise
44. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
45. 461 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1972).
46. 38-American Juri, rudeace 438 (1941), quoted with approval in HaWdns v. Tom of Shaw, 303 F.
Supp. 1162, 1167N� .D. Miss., 1969).
47. See Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972), vere the charge that a certain park in a
Puerto hiRican-bleck sector of New York City Mas being maintained in an unconstitutionally defic-
ient manner was successfully met by the city,s evidence that it had actually been devoting an
eztramili ar ly high level of attention and resources to the
park but that vandalism which it
had been unable to control had produced deficiencies in the park.
-10-
the same local governmental power in the same territory at the same time
by two or more local governmental authorities. For the purpose of prevent-
ing conflicts among overlapping municipal jurisdictions, the courts have
enunciated the general principle against dual functioning in the same
area.48 The principle is commonly stated, indeed, as a principle against
dual existence.
Over against this principle stands the fact that quite universally in the
United States, and universally in Oregon, city territory is also county
territory.
A city and a county may comprise, in whole or in part, the same
territory.49
Sheriffs, moreover, have on countless occasions carried out their duties
in cities, even cities that have had operating municipal police protection.
The paradox thus posed by principle and practice can be explained in part
by noting that a city is a municipal corporation "pure" or "proper," while
a county is, or at least traditionally has been, a quasi-municipal corpora-
! tion.50 The paradox can be further explained by the fact that a sheriff
is in part a state officer and that the law which he is responsible for
enforcing and on the basis of which he is chief conservator of the peace
in a county is state law. Certain case law that nullifies certain county
police jurisdiction inside cities51 on the basis of the general principle
against dual functioning does not appear to nullify the sheriff's powers
and duties inside cities.
That principle does appear, however, to constitute sufficient reason in
conceivable situations for a sheriff to decide, without risk of being
charged with denying "the equal protection of the laws," to carry out peace
conserving and law enforcing functions at a lesser level inside cities than
outside. If a city has power to provide police services inside its bounda-
ries and is actually doing so, the sheriff may with reason conclude that
sheriff's forces should be concentrated mainly outside the city. Even if
the city is providing little or no police service, the fact that it has the
power to do so may constitute sufficient reason, so far as equal protection
is concerned,for the sheriff to devote attention more to areas outside the
city than to the area inside. In either situation, if it is reasonable for
him to operate at a lesser level inside than outside the city, it appears
that he can do so without denying the city or its people "the equal protec-
tion of the laws." Only if the sheriff's decision could be shown to be com-
pletely arbitrary or to be based primarily or exclusively on considerations
of race or wealth would it seem, because of denial of equal protection, to
be subject to invalidation in the courts or to make him liable to a mandatory
injunction to increase his level of policing inside the city.
48. State es rel. Flaxel v. Chandler, 180 Or. 28, 34, 175 P.2d 448 (1946); State ex rel. Meyer
v. County Court for Washington County, 213 Or. 643, 650, 326 P.2a 116 (1958).
49. 62 Cornu, Jur3.s Secundum 2003 (1949).
50. 0. Etter,m.riit,. at 273-75.
51. Ia. at 268-73.
—11—
V
Can the council of the city or, in some other political subdivision that
has power to provide police services, can the governing body determine
the level of police services that the sheriff provides the city or the
subdivision? The answer is generally no. The sheriff has broad discretion
regarding the level of police services that he provides in a particular
area in his county. Cities and other political subdivisions have little
power to control that discretion.
This negative answer must be qualified by observing that, if a certain
low level or an absence of police services in a city or other political
subdivision is the consequence of complete arbitrariness, racism, or dis-
crimination based exclusively or primarily on wealth, the members of the
governing body or council may be able by appropriate proceedings in a
court of competent jurisdiction to compel the sheriff to cease so denying
the people in the city or political subdivision "the equal protection of
the laws."
-12-
"i
}
j MEMO: To Council Members and City Administrator
DATE: June 9 1977
RE: Attached Letter Dated May 17, 1977
a
FROM: Mayor Wilbur Bishop
r I am seriously concerned that communications and information such
as contained in the attached letter goes out to the public without
City Council knowledge or approval. As the Mayor, I seem to get
most of the calls from irate citizens asking "what the hell does
the city think its doing to me". Unfortunately in many cases I
have no knowledge of what the irate citizen is referring to.
a
This situation has got to be stopped. The council must take some
firm action to impress on ALL city employes what they can and
can not say in regards to city policy. Following are some of my
comments on this attached letter:
All of these underlined statements appear as statements of fact
accomplished.
They assume the weight of approved City policy--when no City body
with any kind of final authority had even reviewed, held discussions
or public hearings on the comprehensive Park Plan.
This is an outrageous example of City staff assuming authority it
has no right nor authorization to assume. It has placed the City
Council and Planning Commission members in a very unfortunate public
position.
As mayor and chief elected official of the City of Tigard, I personally
condemn and disavow the tenor and contents of this letter of May 17,
1977 to property owners and particularly those sentences and state-
ments herein underlined. I would hope that my fellow council members
will do likewise.
I also request that the City Council issue a directive to the City
Administrator directing him to advise all department heads that in
the future they screen all communications, written or oral that in
any way would or could be interpreted as accepted City policy (6ouncil
approved policy) . And to warn all staff personnel to carefully and
adeana.tely explain and identify proposed, suggested or recommended
actions and proposals as such when communicating with citizens.
I propose that the City Administrator compose a directive to all City
staff members that have any contact with the public, clarifying their
responsibility not to infer or make city policy when in fact it is
not city policy. This directive should be ready for council approval
at its next meeting--and after approval should be distributed to all
city personnel and then should be initialed by all city staff members
after they have read it thoroughly.
cc; Copies to Planning Commission members also
w
I
i
This part rd . 'oar 1. St-rndclr one have beery pro-mt, tinlef�eA-
.S
This en4 rc plan is now cca.c _fm rcco-n,-,nerAa6n �o, and const' "Ash
b�j -the '61C.0,WD PLAMNirvG (ftY,-^,'5510n ZlM then the C41Co(cnc;l .T3dVk
bodes wol hold public hearinGs brace -mnvuiv6 A clecisron on the
cadop4 on Y'eV15(on, roc o¢ these proposed policies and pl-nns
May 17, 1977
Dear Property Oh-ner:
For the past nine months 44-e City�and its appointed Park and
Fecreation Board have been developing a Comprehensive Par'_
and Cpen Space Plan. The goal of the plan is to insure an
adequate supply of open space end recreational land as the
City continues to develop.
O This planning process is now nearing completion. The final
.�, stages of completing the plan includethe identification of
future park sites. This has been a difficult task. The
0. ?ark Board has devoted three months to czvpluation of vari.cjs
.�, lots in and around the City. Several lots have been identified
as having a potential for park. use.
Park service areas were first identified by population. Then
possible sites selected within each area. For purposes of
rating each site a list of desirable park characteris-LicF
fe:�ulated. Each site thereby received a rating according to
how well it fit the desired ch?racteristi^s.
In the process of evaluating the selected sites your property
on (`:ash. Co. Tar. ; ap Tax 1ct/s
received a high rating as a potentia park. For
this reason, we are contacting you to inform you of the
possibility of your property being designated on the pari: plan
for eventual purchase. In the evert that your pro^ori.
finally selected a ark acquisition and eve opment sch - v
you z+A ..
A . e ac me o urchase. lne time schedule
would be related to sne rate o_ ..eve omen t around tye cite
and the resulting need for recreation facilities. However to
protect the site from being develo-+.ed pricr to the Gc .er?uled
acauisitior. .P 2 r ce ure cr accelerated sur c::asc will 'oo
es�ab'.ished. T:a proposed procedure r:ould -,lace a temporary
..o_ on approval of any official application for de.elepment of
an identified ?ark site. The applicatio:: vc-uld be for-warded to the
Par'_ Board and City Council for a decisior. to either initiated
purchase or allow the property to be developed.
Fage 2 :a,= 17, 1-G77
if the decision is made to purchase the City would '-a--e
18 months to finalize ac uisitiC:'1. To protect tl,e r.rczerty- c•,-nc-r,
t:.e purcas
he price would e establ?c:iPd b;; an inO? : c-nkdent
certified appraisor.
Fifteen sites inthe plan'_iin- area %see att?c':ee been
selected o 21at Tne Planning Comm ssi(,n N-771j:c1d a public
hearing on consideration of these sites, :ay ;1 , ,c?7 -,',e
Commission's decision will be fcr;•rarded to 'I,e C?ty CG'-,nc i1
in the form of a recd=endztion for finel action.
-"lOr t0 t..E 31st IF may call or write me, (sen Alt.,--an -
639-4171, City* Hall) to answer any questions you m,yht
have. Any written st?terents should be `7L'bmitted tit the
Planning Lepartyent prior to 'he ::ay* 31, 1977 so they can be
presented to the commission at the hearing.
Sincerely,
Ben J. Altman
Assistant Plenner
BJA/pr
Encl.
'j
ijj