Korean War Exhibit 1 June 1950. The great victory of World War II
was still a vivid memory. The demobilization of
America's wartime strength had been
accomplished very rapidly. A growing fear of
Joseph Stalin's ambitions was reflected in the new
terms iron curtain and cold war, but much energy
and hope had focused on such developments as Ai06 AA"
the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and
NATO. Korea, leh divided after the war into the
Communist North and the U.S. supported South,
was a source of tension but not immediate
concern.
The United States was content largely to leve to
_ o UN commission the problem of North Korea's United Stares troops assemble at the pier
. The after debarking from a ship, b July 1950.
threatening stance toward South Korea •
.r Russians had withdrawn their troops from the
North in 1948; at the UN's suggestion, America
e ecalled its troops from South Korea in June
�. . Aker evacuating Seoul on 27 June 1950 and crossing 1949, though leaving behind much military I Corps
the Han River in small boats, members of the Korean materiel and some 500 advisers. In a speech in
Military Advisory Group march to Kimpo Airfield. January 1950 outlining American policy in Asia
V after the establishment of Communist China.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson did not include South Korea within the U.S. "defensive perimeter"; those
nations outside that perimeter would have to resist aggression themselves and then rely on the United Nationsfor support.
_ At four in the morning on Sunday, 25 June 1950, North Korea launched a full-scale invasion across the 38th
Parallel into South Korea. The UN Security Council quickly passed a resolution calling on the North Koreans to -
ALcease hostilities and withdraw. When they refused, the Security Council passed a second resolution on the 27th
recommending that UN members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel r
the armed attack and restore the international peace and security in the area."
North Korean forces cross border with South Korea
Meanwhile, the North Korean forces were X Carlos
North Korean People' s Army INKPA) numbers _ advancing rapidly. Seoul, he South
Korean capital, would fall June.
oppronimotely 135 000 men. Republic of Korea ' _
(ROK( Army contoins 98 .000 soldiers -_ These events posed a majorr challenge llenge
to the Truman administration and
NKPA forces capture Seoul _ '- America's allies, for if the invasion -
was not checked, a precedent would Troops of the I st Cavalry Division
I be set that could undermine the move into front lines, 31 Jury 1950.
First U S ground combat troops . Task Force Smith / confidence of countries that relied
( 1 st Battalion . 21 at Infantry. 2Ath Infantry D4vlsion) AIR Hyesanlin on the United States for protection. pr
arrive in Korea The strength and availability of
America's armed forces, however, had been
inch on falls to the NKPA /� eroded by such factors as the massive
postwar demobilization, uneven and neglected _
IN
Task Force Smith engages and delays ocivoncing :usong training, antiquated equipment and, despite
NKPA forces at
Cl >n first U S ground anion of improvement, some residual racial segregation.
the war President Truman did not hesitate. He immediately Unite of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery
instructed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at regroup before moving to the front line, 2
21 st Infantry stalls NKPA advances or Chochiwon his For East Command headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, to August 1950.
Pyongyang supply South Korean forces with ammunition and equip-
25#h InFantry and 1 It Cavalry Divisions begin move - ment. On 26 June Truman then authorized MacArthur to use U.S. air
~I to Korea from Japan . 29Ah Regimental Combat t__ and naval units against North Korean targets below the 38th Parallel,
Team sails from China oto for Korea, 2d Infantry and the next day, seizing on the new Security Council resolution, he
Dnmion prepares to embork from Seattle 38th Parallel extended the range of those targets to include those in North Korea. He
also authorized the use of U.S. ground forces to protect Pusan , South
Koreas major port. On 30 June, after MacArthur had gone to Korea to -
19th and 3AIh infantry Regiments, 24th Infantry assess Are situation, Truman authorized MacArthur to use all of his A heavy mirror Division,
d 1s iNh ►t/adry Divission
Division, fight dsfaying actans at Kvm River line available forces to repel the invasion and blockade the Korean coast. positions
not. 24th Division, rheas Werth Kereon
pas+tions. fl July 1950.
244h Infantry Divis.on begins defense of Toejon When the Security Council on 7 July recommended the establishment of
SEOUL a unified command in Korea, under a U.S. commander, Truman
appointed MacArthur as Commander in Chief. United Nations
' %arse is capitwed by NKPA . 244h Infantry. 25th . Command It. Gen. Walton H. Walker. Commander, U.S. Eighth Army,
tnfon" Dirisron , coplurn ysch'on Inchon :'` 7 •r assumed command of all UN ground forces, which included those of the
X Republic of Koreo. U S ground forces available to MacArthur included
29th Regiment engo" the enrny near Clsmju r the 1 st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th, and 2% Infantry Divisions
in Japan and the 29th Regiment on Okinawa The divisions locked o .
5th Re9unrKaf Coerbes loom arrives i i Karroo horn Chochiwon third of their infantry and artillery units, and existing unite were etre
kilaaaOri Yrxh'on American and South Korean understrength Ammunition reserves were low, and training had been
sokfisrs with browning out whc sacrificed to occupation duties " -
"Oki" {Pusan) Prtanew is toW r � � �rt rifles team up, 20 July 1950
Pusan ►erM^` Given the momentum of the North Korean advance and the general
=redness of U S forces when they arrived, General Walker's was to gain time through extended
WPA astemn
pnt to pentrose Nolittorp fPvsonl %Wien delarisive delaying actions. The price of engaging the enamy with an inadequate force hal been clearly n e
Pr.easer and a repelled by 2Ath . 2d. rd 25* domonttroted in early July when Task Force Smith, flown in from Japan as an advance element of Are 241h
Mksmtry Disnsiont olanp WAIN Morns elements in �k9u Division. was attaked and had to reeeavy kis
tat with hses of men and equipment M fighting that grew as fierce Arrorwon epl�rs m
on a machine pari ort me
Ate Fuss Bon* of die Nokto" f.ufpe • as many Work) War 11 battle, Walker's combined UN forces gradually fest back to the south under mutant Not#+ fivrit 14 July 1950.
Korean pressure But .n navy August Walker changed the strolegy, ordering a heal stand along a 140-mile
pavrmMr cim"Id the row well stocked port of Pusan
tie I emit of 234d and 27* Infantry Re9rntN is ovd Chinju
SOK 1 st Dnis.an sucratsfvlly defend Noktong • Puson With greot courage, determination. and
I►e+onf Prirwrter rt Ata 6*06 of Ars Bortast9 ARey r.,. odrat movements beh~ delanuve
fvvew of TaisiI pOsoicim, Walker's combined troops held
Its penmeM
into September At ** sane
second some of tM NssUtra9 6%4" lime, the Eighth Army's shrgth was
ougnienled by mrd Au{Nit by the arrival of the U S
2d D v awn, A e 1 N Prov s anal Maine Brigade, four
bWrolions d n+edium inks Iran the United Stales.
oncl Ass 5th Regimrtrol Combat Team from Hain i.
By the ref of August a number of South Kansan lose
` '``te 4riy'Amdrvisa (s
n , at regroupedand Groot Bntarn
committed +h 27th CarmanwsafAt In6rifty
fingode prom Hate Karp
Uwewd fears Ivory CwIler d 11111syissoty - The titknsgqer vras sal Under U 5 Amy. 6 Asiri d the 751 iltaettetiesorsrt Cayiewy
Dass. aW awn inti broNe+i Itadertlary Are UNforce had clta#ed o a Oak rnlh slMtMsiar! arisen ,nits
III* *WARNiiiisse mwh forgot but rto sornewhat weakerwid 11etw 10 Agwt 1930.
inat Nam 06" Wi rew+lotce W M un w wwas place General
Nit. twre. t ad McK/ dwV r by mid-5splwrtf0ot ready so pis an
0gs.,.SM.I tits, mcv, n.as>tiwr. tti offensive